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ANENCEPHALIC INFANTS AS ORGAN DONORS: A QUESTION OF
LIFE OR DEATH*
The prospect of a larger supply of organ donors is positive
in the abstract. But when the source of organs is anencephalic
infants, a number of medical, ethical and legal concerns arise.
The Author proposes that ventilator programs, provided that
they follow certain ethical guidelines, are the best solution to
the current debate. These programs balance the urgent need for
organ donors with society's broader interest in respect for
human life.
FROM THE MINUTE she was born, Baby Gabriel - named
for the archangel who guards the gates of heaven - was dy-
ing.1 She suffered from anencephaly, a fatal congenital defect in
which most of the brain is missing, except for a small portion of
the brainstem. The brainstem of an anencephalic infant often sus-
tains respiration so that vital organs function for a short time.'
Baby Gabriel's parents did not discover her condition until
the eighth month of pregnancy, when the mother was prompted to
have an ultrasound because the fetus had stopped kicking.3 Early
in the pregnancy, the parents declined testing that could have de-
tected the defect. Once the abnormality was discovered, Baby
Gabriel's parents were given three options: induction of labor,
Caesarean section, or carrying the fetus to term. They decided to
continue the pregnancy and deliver their baby by natural child-
birth.5 They also approached physicians about offering their in-
fant's organs for donation.'
* The Author would like to thank Professor Rebecca Susan Dresser for her ideas
and help.
1. Blakeslee, Baby Without Brain Kept Alive to Give Heart, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19,
1987, at Al, col. 4 [hereinafter Blakeslee, Baby Kept Alive].
2. See Fletcher, Robertson & Harrison, Primates and Anencephalics as Sources for
Pediatric Organ Transplants, 1 FETAL THERAPY 150 (1986) [hereinafter Sources]. See
infra text accompanying notes 23-27.
3. Annas, From Canada With Love: Anencephalic Newborns as Organ Donors?,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1987, at 36, 36.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Blakeslee, Baby Kept Alive, supra note 1, at Al, col. 4.
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Baby Gabriel was born on Monday, October 12, 1987 at Sol-
dier's Hospital in Orillia, Ontario.7 She breathed on her own
through the first night.' The next day, she was transferred to Chil-
dren's Hospital in Western Ontario and placed on a ventilator.9
Meanwhile, a recipient for Baby Gabriel's heart was found at
Loma Linda University Medical Center (Loma Linda) in Los An-
geles.1" Dr. Leonard L. Bailey1 was treating a patient who in a
few weeks was due to deliver a fetus with hypoplastic left heart
syndrome, a fatal disease in which the heart's left chamber is
missing or atrophied. 2
Late Wednesday afternoon, physicians determined that Baby
Gabriel could no longer breathe on her own and that she met the
legal criteria for brain death.' She was flown immediately to
Loma Linda, where her death was confirmed.' 4 That Friday, Baby
Gabriel's heart was transplanted into Paul Holc, who was deliv-
ered three hours earlier by Caesarean section.' 5 This was the first
successful heart transplant from an anencephalic infant.'"
Through his first year, Paul was a healthy, active child.' 7
Baby Gabriel's story of tragedy and redemption has broad
medical, ethical, and legal implications. Parents of anencephalic
infants throughout the United States have expressed the same de-
sire as Baby Gabriel's parents: that their child's organs be
donated to bring life and health to other children.' 8 However, con-
troversy has blocked further development of anencephalic organ
7. Id.
8. Annas, supra note 3, at 36.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Dr. Bailey is widely recognized for his pioneering work in infant heart trans-
plants. In 1984 he transplanted a baboon heart into a 12-day-old girl, who survived 20
days. Baby is Awake and Moving After Transplant, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1987, at 34, col.
4 [hereinafter Baby is Awake].
12. Id.
13. Annas, supra note 3. Some commentators have questioned whether Baby
Gabriel's death was properly determined. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
14. Annas, supra note 3, at 36.
15. Baby is Awake, supra note 11, at 34, col. 4.
16. Walters & Ashwal, Organ Prolongation in Anencephalic Infants: Ethical &
Medical Issues, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct.-Nov. 1988, at 19, 20.
17. Note, Death Unto Life: Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors, 74 VA. L. REv.
1527, 1528 n.9 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Organ Donors].
18. See, e.g., Brain-Deficient Baby Dies; Organs Are Donated, N.Y. Times, March
1, 1988, at C19, col. 1 [hereinafter Brain-Deficient Baby]; Plan to Donate Doomed Fetus's
Organs Stirs Debate, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1987, at A23, col. 2 [hereinafter Plan to
Donate].
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donation in the United States. This Note analyzes the various ap-
proaches to obtaining organs from anencephalic infants,' 9 focusing
on such fundamental issues as defining death and using one
human being for the sake of another.
In Part I, this Note explains why anencephalic infants may
create an excellent source of pediatric organs, and why the need
for these organs is urgent. Part I also outlines the underlying con-
troversy concerning the definition of death. Part II discusses the
proposed methods of anencephalic organ donation. Part III exam-
ines the legal, ethical, medical and policy objections to these
methods. Part IV explores the interests of all parties involved in
the debate - the infant, the parents2" and society - and develops
the arguments that support or undermine such interests.
Part V concludes that preserving respect for human life out-
weighs the unknown benefits of anencephalic organ donation. In-
stead of allowing these infants to be killed so their organs can be
used for transplants, procedures should be developed to preserve
the organs until the infants meet the established criteria for death.
This Note sets forth several safeguards to ensure that these pro-
grams are ethically sound. If these programs prove unsuccessful,
this Note proposes that the data they generate be used to recon-
sider other approaches to obtaining organs from anencephalic
infants.
I. THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ANENCEPHALIC ORGAN
DONATION
Cases such as Baby Gabriel's have stirred great controversy.
The argument advanced by parents of anencephalic infants and
echoed by many physicians, is both lofty and logical: anencephalic
infants could be an invaluable source of organs at a time when the
ability to transplant pediatric organs far exceeds the supply of or-
gans. The major obstacle to anencephalic organ donation, how-
ever, is formidable. These donations challenge an ancient and fun-
damental concept already in transition: the definition of death.
A. The Anencephalic Infant as Organ Donor
Anencephaly is a congenital absence of skull, scalp and fore-
19. Discussion of anencephalic fetuses is beyond the scope of this Note.
20. The term "parents" has been chosen for purposes of brevity and clarity. It also
includes single parents.
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brain, or cerebral hemispheres. 21 The cause is generally unknown,
but is thought to operate very early in gestation.2 There are two
types of anencephaly. In one, the skull and brain do not form
above the brainstem; in the other, the skull and brainstem are pre-
sent but the brain is not.23 Despite this devastating anomaly, the
newborn's brainstem - itself often seriously malformed - may
sustain its vital organs for a short time.24 The vital organs are
intact and usually of high quality." The brainstem also regulates
involuntary reflexes such as yawning, sucking, swallowing and fa-
cial grimaces.26 But because the babies lack any higher brain
function, they generally are assumed to have no consciousness or
awareness.
27
Anencephalic infants have been called "the most promising
source of pediatric organs." 28 They have been singled out primar-
ily because the infants often have healthy vital organs, yet they
meet a certain and swift death.29 Anencephaly is always fatal;
there is no treatment."0 The only course of intervention is abor-
tion. At least ninety-five percent of anencephalics die within their
first week of life; only forty percent survive longer than twenty-
four hours.31 Anencephaly is one of few conditions for which
third-trimester abortions are permitted in the United States.32
21. See, e.g., Shewmon, Anencephaly: Selected Medical Aspects, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Oct.-Nov. 1988, at I1, 11.
22. Id.
23. Caplan, Should Foetuses or Infants be Utilized as Organ Donors?, BIOETHIcS,
Apr. 1987, at 119, 123.
24. Shewmon, supra note 21, at 15 (the longest survival on record is fourteen
months).
25. Sources, supra note 2, at 155.
26. President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Bi-
omedical and Behavioral Research, Defining Death: A Report on the Medical, Legal and
Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death 15, 18 (1981) [hereinafter Defining Death].
27. Id. at 15.
28. Sources, supra note 2, at 151.
29. Walters & Ashwal, supra note 16, at 21; see also Botkin, Anencephalic Infants
as Organ Donors, 82 PEDIATRICS 250, 253 (1988) ("The difference does not lie in the level
of neurological function but in the length of life to be sacrificed.").
30. Baird & Sadovnick, Survival in Infants with Anencephaly, 23 CLINICAL PEDIAT-
RIcs 268, 271 (1984).
31. Baird & Sadovnick, supra note 30, at 270. But see Shewmon, supra note 21, at
15 ("Although it is commonly stated that [anencephalic] infants invariably die within a
few days of birth, various large studies and a number of anecdotal reports of longer surviv-
als cast serious doubt on this contention.").
32. Chervenak, Farley, Walters, Hobbins & Mahoney, When is Termination of
Pregnancy During the Third Trimester Morally Justifiable?, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 501,
501 (1984). Anencephaly fulfills two conditions that make the termination of pregnancy
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Anencephaly also is "relatively common." 3 Somewhere be-
tween 1,850 to 3,000 infants are born with anencephaly in the
United States each year. 4 This ranks anencephaly as the second
most common congenital anomaly causing premature mortality,
according to the Centers for Disease Control.35  Finally,
anencephaly can be diagnosed with a high degree of certainty. 8
Once the infant is born, anencephaly is obvious and easily diag-
nosed.37 Additionally, prenatal testing such as ultrasonographic
and alpha-foetal protein (AFP) screening, which is becoming in-
creasingly available, can detect almost all cases of anencephaly.38
Anencephalic organ donation has been proven to be success-
ful. Published reports - from countries including the United
States, West Germany and France - recount at least twenty-
three kidney transplants using anencephalic infant donors since
the early 1960s. 39 Many of the transplants were successful. 40 Re-
nal transplants were especially successful in recipients aged eight
to forty-four years old.41
The most celebrated cases involved Adrian Kantrowitz's at-
tempts to perform the world's first human-to-human heart trans-
morally justifiable: the fetus is afflicted with a condition that is incompatible with postnatal
survival for more than a few weeks and has total or virtual absence of cognitive function.
These factors can be determined prenatally by highly reliable diagnostic procedures. Id.
33. Baird & Sadovnick, supra note 30, at 270.
34. See Capron, Anencephalic Donors: Separate the Dead From the Dying, HAs-
TINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1987, at 5, 5 (between 2,000 and 3,000 anencephalic babies are
born each year according to Godfrey Oakley of the Centers of Disease Control); Sources,
supra note 2, at 155 (about 1,850 born each year). Only 25 percent to 45 percent of
anencephalic infants are born alive. Baird & Sadovnick, supra note 30, at 268.
35. Goldsmith, Anencephalic Organ Donor Program Suspended: Loma Linda Re-
port Expected to Detail Findings, 260 J. A.M.A. 1671, 1672 (1988).
36. Ethics and Social Impact Committee, Transplant Policy Center, Anencephalic
Infants as Sources of Transplantable Organs, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov. 1988, at 28,
29 [hereinafter Transplant Policy Center] ("[B]ecause the condition in question is the ab-
sence of the entire top of the brain, the presence of [anencephaly] can be determined with-
out any dispute."). But see infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
37. Caplan, supra note 23, at 123.
38. See Landwirth, Should Anencephalic Infants Be Used as Organ Donors?, 82
PEDIATRIcS 257, 257 (1988).
39. See Caplan, supra note 23, at 129; Landwirth, supra note 38, at 257; Sources,
supra note 2, at 155; Walters & Ashwal, supra note 16, at 19. Only Landwirth describes
the method used to procure the organs. The infants are given respiratory support at birth,
and the organs are removed before the donor's condition reaches brain death. Landwirth,
supra note 38, at 257.
40. See Caplan, supra note 23, at 129; Landwirth, supra note 28, at 257; Sources,
supra note 2, at 155.
41. See Walters & Ashwal, supra note 16, at 20.
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plant using anencephalic newborns' hearts.42 In 1966 Kantrowitz
waited for an anencephalic infant's heart to stop beating before
declaring death and performing the transplant. Once death oc-
curred, the infant could not be resuscitated. Nevertheless, Kantro-
witz found anencephalic heart donors to be a "realistic possibil-
ity."' 43 Less than two years later, he used an anencephalic
newborn's heart for the first human-to-human heart transplant in
the United States.44 The recipient survived only six and one-half
hours, but Kantrowitz described the procedure as "technically
successful. 45
B. The Need for Anencephalic Organ Donation
Anencephalic organ donation not only has demonstrated po-
tential for medical success, it also would fulfill the critical needs
of children with debilitating or otherwise fatal diseases, parents of
anencephalic infants who wish to donate their infant's organs, and
medical practice and research.
1. Organ Recipients
Significant advances have been made in pediatric transplan-
tation.46 Children less than one year old have undergone success-
ful heart, liver and kidney transplants.47 Experience in managing
small patients and organs along with the development of new ther-
apeutic agents promises continued improvement in survival
rates.48 These advances offer hope to scores of children with other-
wise fatal diseases. Each year, transplantation could help 300 to
500 children with end-stage renal disease; 400 to 1,000 children
with liver failure; and 400 to 600 children with fatal forms of con-
genital heart disease, such as hypoplastic left heart syndrome.49
42. Id. at 782.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 790.
46. See, e.g., Botkin, supra note 29, at 250 ("Major transplantation has become an
acceptable alternative treatment for a variety of childhood diseases."); Landwirth, supra
note 38, at 257 ("Significant progress has been made in the transplantation of small organs
and the use of immunosuppressive agents in growing children.").
47. Botkin, supra note 29, at 250. But only pediatric liver and bone marrow trans-
plantation are well developed. Sources, supra note 2, at 151. See infra notes 169-79 and
accompanying text.
48. Botkin, supra note 29, at 250.
49. The estimates vary. See, e.g., Landwirth, supra note 38, at 257; Sources, supra
note 2, at 151. Other types of transplantation are being developed that would benefit many
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Although the demand for small organs is acute, the supply is
critically low. The shortage is greater for infants than for children
and adults.50 Most dying newborns are not suitable organ donors.
Either their underlying disease, or the life support systems and
drugs administered in neonatal intensive care makes their organs
unusable.5 1 The pool of potential pediatric donors usually consists
of children who die from child abuse, asphyxiation, sudden infant
death syndrome 52 and auto accidents.5 These donors number very
few. For example, only about 1,200 children die in auto accidents
each year.5 ' This shortage of organs is likely to worsen as trans-
plantation techniques are perfected. 55
2. Parents of Anencephalic Infants
Many parents of anencephalics, like Baby Gabriel's, have ur-
gently pressed physicians and hospital administrators to allow do-
nation of their infant's organs.56 One mother who carried her
anencephalic infant to term and wanted the infant's organs
children, such as transplantation of fetal neural tissues and cellular grafts. Id.
50. Sources, supra note 2, at 156. Congress responded to the severe shortage of via-
ble organs for transplantation in 1984 with the National Organ Transplant Act. Pub. L.
No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 273-74e
(Supp. IV 1986)). The Act was passed to stimulate research and nationally integrate organ
procurement procedures. It also ordered that a Task Force on Organ Transplantation be
formed to help increase organ donation. Note, Organ Donors, supra note 17, at 1531.
Among the task force's findings was that at any given time, there are an estimated 8,000 to
10,000 people waiting for an organ donation. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFT AcT, 8a U.L.A. 2, 3
(Supp. 1988) (quoting the task force's 1986 report "Organ Transplantation: Issues and
Recommendations").
51. Sources, supra note 2, at 154.
52. Caplan, supra note 23, at 121.
53. Sources, supra note 2, at 151.
54. Id. This number is expected to decrease because of seat belt laws and improved
methods of carrying children in cars. Transplant Policy Center, supra note 36, at 29; Note,
Organ Donors, supra note 17, at 1531.
55. See, e.g., Sources, supra note 2, at 152 ("Development of additional transplant
therapies ... will increase demand for organs for newborns and lead to the supply and
distributional problems that now exist with pediatric livers and adult organs.") (footnote
omitted).
56. See, e.g., Brain-Deficient Baby, supra note 18, at C19, col. 1 (parents pleased
they could donate heart valves, eyes and corneas of anencephalic infant); New Attention
Focused on Infant Donors, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1987, at A18, col. 1 (parents persuade
physicians to maintain anencephalic infant on respirator so its organs can be donated).
Loma Linda has received more than 200 inquiries from parents and physicians represent-
ing parents about the possibility of using organs of anencephalic infants to save others'
lives. Infant Transplant Program is Halted to Reassess Issues, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20,
1988, at 7, col. 1.
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donated explained, "When we found out about the baby, that was
devastating enough. But when we discovered that the organs
would all be healthy and normal and that babies who need a liver
or heart couldn't get them, well, that's when we started getting
into it." 51
3. Medicine
Pediatric organ donations are crucial to gaining the necessary
knowledge of basic biology for pediatric transplantation. Despite
its advances, pediatric transplantation remains experimental.58
Not enough is known, for example, about the immune systems of
very young infants or the ability of transplanted organs and tis-
sues to support normal growth and development in a growing child
or adolescent. 59 The scarcity of organs and tissues also is slowing
research in new areas, such as developing infant neural trans-
plants to reverse age-related dementias such as Parkinson's
disease.6 °
C. The Core of the Controversy: Defining Death
Despite the need for organs of anencephalic infants, their
procurement faces a formidable obstacle. The Uniform Anatomi-
cal Gift Act (UAGA)61 - now adopted in every state 2 - man-
dates that removal of organs for transplantation occur only "upon
or after death."63 This so-called "dead donor" rule draws
anencephalic organ donation into an area of heated legal, medical
and ethical debate: the definition of death.
1. The Heart-Lung Criteria
Traditionally, lay and medical communities alike followed
57. Plan to Donate, supra note 18, at 16, col. 2.
58. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 3, at 38 ("Currently, [infant organ transplants] are
extremely experimental. ... ); Sources, supra note 2, at 151 (Other than transplantation
of livers and bone marrow, pediatric transplantation is not well developed.").
59. Caplan, supra note 23, at 125.
60. Id. at 125-26.
61. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 3 (a)(3), 8a U.L.A. 2 (Supp. 1990).
62. Id. (prefatory note).
63. The UAGA defines an anatomical gift as "a donation of all or part of a human
body to take effect upon or after death." Id. § 1(1), at 4 (emphasis added). This so-called
"dead donor" rule is stressed throughout the statute. For example, it provides: "If there has
been an anatomical gift, a technician may remove any donated parts . . . after determina-
tion of death by a physician or surgeon." Id. § 8(c), at 15.
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ancient custom and clear logic to determine death: they looked for
the cessation of heartbeat and breathing."' The common law ar-
ticulated this heart-lung standard.65 But medical technology ren-
dered it obsolete in certain situations. Mechanical respirators and
related therapies were developed that could reverse the failure of
respiration and circulation. Patients now could experience com-
plete and irreversible loss of all brain functions but continue to
exhibit artificially maintained cardiopulmonary activity. Tradi-
tional means of diagnosing death were inadequate for these per-
manently comatose patients.66
These developments raised many new medical concerns. Phy-
sicians could not assure that appropriate care would be given to
these patients or that artificial support would be replaced with
"more fitting and respectful" behavior when a patient died. Doc-
tors also were troubled about prolonging the grieving of families
and allotting scarce and costly intensive-care facilities to patients
who would never be resuscitated.67
The development of organ transplantation in the 1950s and
1960s also triggered physicians' interests in the definition of
death. Because organs deteriorate quickly once respiration and
circulation stop, the best organ donors are otherwise healthy per-
sons who died from traumatic head injuries but whose breathing
and circulation are artificially maintained.68 Physicians needed
new criteria to determine death in these patients without removing
them from life-support long enough for their organs to become
nonviable.
2. The Brain-Oriented Criteria
The most important response to the medical concerns about
diagnosing death in respirator-supported patients was a 1968 re-
port of a Harvard Medical School ad hoc committee, now known
as the "Harvard Criteria." In this report, the committee proposed
64. Defining Death, supra note 26, at 5.
65. Id. Courts often cited the definition of death found in Black's Law Dictionary:
"The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a total stoppage of the
circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent
thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4th ed. 1968)
(emphasis added). See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 586, 317 S.W.2d 275, 279
(1958); Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App.2d 371, 376, 215 P.2d 478, 481-82 (1950).
66. See Defining Death, supra note 26, at 22.
67. Id. at 24.
68. Id. at 23.
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that the absence of brain functioning is an acceptable alternative
criteria for determining death when respiratory and circulatory
functions are being artificially maintained in an irreversibly coma-
tose patient.69 It provided four criteria by which to determine the
absence of brain functions.70
Although the specific Harvard Criteria were criticized and
refined,7' the medical community generally accepted the new
"whole brain death" standard.72 In fact, the Harvard committee
predicted that statutory changes in the law would not be necessary
"since the law treats this question essentially as one of fact to be
determined by physicians. 7 3 It argued that legislation would be
necessary only if "great controversy were engendered surrounding
the subject and physicians were unable to agree on the new medi-
cal criteria. 1 4
The committee's worst scenario was realized. The new stan-
dard created confusion and controversy among the public and
physicians. Fears arose that the brain death criteria would be used
to enable premature organ transplantation.7 5 Public controversy
69. Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of
Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337, 339 (1968) [hereinafter
Harvard Criteria]. The committee provided tvo reasons for its redefinition: first, "[tihe
burden is great on patients who suffer permanent loss of intellect, on their families, on the
hospitals, and on those in need of hospital beds already occupied by these comatose pa-
tients"; and second, "[o]bsolete criteria for the definition of death can lead to controversy
in obtaining organs for transplantation." Id. at 337.
70. The Criteria were: 1) unreceptivity and unresponsitivity; 2) no movements or
breathing; 3) no reflexes; and 4) flat electroencephalogram. Defining Death, supra note 26,
at 25. Discussion of the medical aspects of criteria used to determine brain death is beyond
the scope of this Note.
71. Id. at 25 (explaining major criticisms of the Harvard Criteria).
72. Id. at 31. ("It now seems clear that a medical consensus about clinical practices
and their scientific basis has emerged: certain states of brain activity and inactivity, to-
gether with their neurophysiological consequences, can be reliably detected and used to
diagnose death.") (emphasis added).
73. Harvard Criteria, supra note 69, at 339.
74. Id.
75. In response to these concerns, the Task Force on Death and Dying of the Insti-
tute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences issued a report that clarified and evaluated
the Harvard Criteria. Note, Organ Donors, supra note 17, at 1537. The task force
concluded:
[T]he need for organs is not and should not be a reason for changing these
criteria, and especially for selecting any given criterion or procedure. Choice of
the criteria for pronouncing a man dead ought to be completely independent of
whether or not he is a potential donor of organs. The procedures, criteria, and
the actual judgment in determining the death of one human being must not be
contaminated with the needs of others, no matter how legitimate those needs
may be.
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brewed during the famous Karen Ann Quinlan case 6 over brain
death and the question of discontinuing life-support for patients in
a persistent vegetative state.7 Confusion over the difference be-
tween permanent unconsciousness and death resulted in the mis-
apprehension that there now were several levels of death.7 8 Fi-
nally, courts and legislatures produced widely divergent responses
to the new brain death criteria. Some courts adhered to the tradi-
tional cardiopulmonary standard; 9 others updated the criteria to
include a whole brain death standard. 0 Likewise, states adopted a
"patch-work" body of death statutes.8'
The need for a uniform law was apparent. In 1980 - twelve
years after the Harvard Criteria were published - the Uniform
Determination of Death Act (UDDA) 82  was drafted.83  Most
Id. at 1537 n.74.
A scenario that perhaps goes beyond even the public's worst fears is played out in the
popular book and movie Coma, which depicts physicians who induce comas in patients
undergoing minor surgery and reap huge profits from the sale of organs on the black mar-
ket. R. COOK. COMA (1977); Coma (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1978).
76. In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (Super Ct. Ch.
Div. 1975), modified, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (father
of daughter in persistent vegetative state sought the power to authorize discontinuation of
extraordinary means of sustaining her vital processes.).
77. See generally Note, Organ Donors, supra note 17, at 1541-43 (discussing Quin-
lan). The Quinlan case focused public attention on the brain death criteria, breaking "new
judicial ground by linking legal concepts of life, death, and quality of life to the validity of
medical predictions." Id. at 1542. But these considerations are irrelevant to the determina-
tion of death. The issue in Quinlan was whether to discontinue treatment of a living patient
who never would recover consciousness, not whether the patient was in fact, or should be
considered, dead. See Defining Death, supra note 26, at 61 n.8 (withholding treatment of
permanently comatose patients is a "distinct bioethical and legal issue receiving separate
attention from the President's Commission").
78. Capron, supra note 34, at 7. The Harvard Criteria's use of the term "irreversible
coma" reflects this confusion. The committee claimed its purpose was to "define irreversi-
ble coma as a new criterion for death." Harvard Criteria, supra note 70, at 337. But this
definition embraces contradictory terms. While "coma" is a condition of living patients, it
is the absence of any brain function which indicates death. See Defining Death, supra note
26, at 25.
79. See Defining Death, supra note 26, at 135-36. This judicial stance may have led
to troubling results in some criminal cases. Physicians who terminated life-support were
charged with murder, and homicide defendants argued that termination of life support and
organ removal were the proximate causes of the victim's death. These arguments were
uniformly rejected, however. Id. For discussions of these cases, see W. LAFAVE & A.
ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 7.1(d) (2d ed. 1986); Defining Death, supra note 26, at 136-
39; Note, Organ Donors, supra note 17, at 1538-40.
80. See Defining Death, supra note 26, at 137-42.
81. See id. at 109-10.
82. 12 U.L.A. 310 (Supp. 1989).
83. The UDDA superseded the short-lived Uniform Brain Death Act (UBDA).
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states have now adopted by statute or judicial decision a definition
of death identical or similar to the one contained in the UDDA."4
The UDDA provides that: "An individual who has sustained ei-
ther (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory func-
tions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire
brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death
must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards." 5
The problem anencephalic organ donation poses is this:
Under the UDDA's second, "whole brain" criteria for determin-
ing death, anencephalic infants continue to live while they exhibit
residual brainstem activity. Removal of infant organs before total
brain death would violate the UAGA's "dead donor" rule. 6 It
therefore would constitute murder under present law8 7 and the
type of active euthanasia88 prohibited by the American medical
community. 9 However, the circulatory and respiratory systems of
these infants are so poor that if physicians do not intervene until
UNIF. BRAIN DEATH ACT, 12 U.L.A. 16, 16 (Supp. 1989). The UBDA was drafted by the
Conference on Uniform State Laws and criticized because it failed to incorporate the
cardiopulmonary standard in addition to the whole brain standard. Note, Organ Donors,
supra note 17, at 1544. The UDDA was drafted through a joint effort of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (the Pres-
ident's Commission), the American Medical Association and the American Bar Associa-
tion. Defining Death, supra note 26, at 160. The President's Commission reported that the
uniform law sought to describe death as a single phenomenon; constitute incremental
rather than radical change; create uniformity among people and situations; and be adapta-
ble to advances in technology. Id. at 57-61.
84. Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UDDA. See
UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT. 12 U.L.A. 310 (Supp. 1989) (table of jurisdictions
that have adopted the act). Fifteen states have adopted similar provisions. See Comment,
Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors: Legal and Ethical Perspectives; 9 J. LEGAL MED.
449, 451 n.16 (1988) (listing the state statutes). And in several other states, judges have
recognized a similar standard. Defining Death, supra note 26, at 61. Comment, supra at
451, n.16. The committee that proposed the 1987 UAGA decided that it was unnecessary
to include the UDDA definition of death in the UAGA because almost all states have
similar definitions by statute or judicial decision, and those that do not have been urged to
adopt the UDDA by the Task Force on Organ Transplantation. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT
ACT (1987) § 3 (a)(3), 8a U.L.A. 2, 5-6 (Supp. 1990) (comments to section one).
85. Uniform Determination of Death Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 293 (emphasis added).
86. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 234-42 and accompanying text.
88. Active euthanasia involves "direct action designed to kill [a] patient." Rachels,
Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEw ENG. J. MED. 78, 78 (1975).
89. Id. The House of Delegates of the American Medical Association endorsed this
statement in 1973: "The intentional termination of the life of one human being by another
- mercy killing - is contrary to that for which the medical profession stands and is
contrary to the policy of the American Medical Association." Id.
[Vol. 40:781
ANENCEPHALIC INFANTS AS ORGAN DONORS
the newborns are legally "dead," their organs will deteriorate to
the point of being physiologically unsuitable for transplantation.90
Thus, the current law lessens the possibilities of organ donation
from anencephalic infants.
II. METHODS OF OBTAINING ANENCEPHALIC INFANT ORGANS
Various methods have been tested and proposed to circum-
vent the legal and medical obstacles to obtaining organs from
anencephalic infants.9' The two basic approaches are: removing
the infants' organs before total brain death (the immediate pro-
curement approach), and preserving the infants' organs until
whole brain death occurs (the intervention approach). Either ap-
proach entails a significant departure from the customary "com-
fort care" given to anencephalic babies, which usually includes
warmth, nutrition and hydration. 2
A. The Immediate Procurement Approach
Some commentators advocate that surgeons should remove
the organs of anencephalic newborns for transplant immediately
after delivery and before total brain death. This immediate pro-
curement approach avoids any deterioration of the organs and
maximizes the potential for medically successful transplants.
Surgeons in West Germany removed the kidneys of an
anencephalic infant before brain death without any legal ramifica-
tions.9 3 Surgeons involved in the procedure wrote, "[W]e think
that one can treasure the principle [of a total brain death defini-
tion] and at the same time argue for a morally acceptable excep-
tion.' 94 Two American groups have supported this immediate pro-
curement method. Physicians at Boston Children's Hospital
90. Caplan, supra note 23, at 123.
91. In addition, many task forces have been formed to examine the issue. They in-
clude task forces at the Washington University Medical Center in St. Louis, University of
Virginia Medical Center, the Child Neurology Society, the American Academy of Pediat-
rics, and the American Academy of Neurology. Walters & Ashwal, supra note 16, at 20.
92. See Sources, supra note 2, at 155.
93. See Holzgreve, Belier, Buchholz, Hansmann & K6hler, Kidney Transplantation
from Anencephalic Donors, 316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1069, 1069 (1987) [hereinafter Kidney
Transplantation]. West German courts have determined that anencephalic fetuses are
never alive despite the presence of a heart beat and allow these pregnancies to be termi-
nated at any time. Id.
94. Holzgreve & Belier, Correspondence - Kidney Transplantation from
Anencephalic Donors, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 961, 961 (1987).
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devised a protocol in 1986 for the immediate removal of organs
after birth.9 5 The protocol was never implemented, however, be-
cause the procedure is currently illegal." The Michigan Ethics
and Social Impact Committee at the Transplant Policy Center
also adopted the immediate procurement position in a 1988 re-
port.9 7 The committee asserted that it does not "seek to resolve
the underlying dilemma presented by alternative conceptions of
brain death . . . . [W]e cannot say with confidence whether
anencephalic infants should be thought of as alive or dead ....
We defend not an intermediate position in the conflict . . . but a
position that bypasses that conflict."9' 8 The committee explained
that anencephaly is
a condition so special, so very different from all others, and one
whose diagnosis and prognosis can be established with such
manifest certainty, that infants in this most unfortunate cohdi-
tion should be viewed as in a class that is entirely sui generis,
and one for which special rules and laws should apply. 9
Unlike the Michigan group, most commentators have con-
fronted the whole brain death problem. One possible solution is
amending the law to enable organ procurement before
anencephalic infants meet whole brain death criteria.
1. Amending the UDDA
Some philosophers argue that the whole brain death standard
is outmoded and should be replaced by a cortical or "higher
brain" standard. °00 Their position is based on the premise that
95. Waiters & Ashwal, supra note 16, at 20.
96. Id.
97. Transplant Policy Center, supra note 36, at 28. The committee recommending
this policy included "two transplant surgeons, two transplant coordinators, a transplant
social worker, a nephrologist, an epidemiologist, a neonatologist, a psychiatrist, a nurse
educator, a health policy planner, a transplant recipient, two philosophers, and two mem-
bers of the clergy." Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.; see also Landwirth, supra note 38, at 257 (noting that kidneys have been
transplanted from anencephalic infants artificially supported at birth but removed before
brain death).
100. See, e.g., Green & Wikler, Brain Death and Personal Identity, 9 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 105, 131 (1980) ("[I]t is loss of upper brain function which marks the person's death.
Death of the brain stem is no more constitutive of death simpliciter than death of the
kidneys or of other vital organs."); Veatch, The Whole-Brain-Oriented Concept of Death:
An Outmoded Philosophical Formulation, 3 J. THANATOLOGY 13, 29 (1975) (arguing that
patients or their agents should be given the choice of a cardiopulmonary, brain-oriented, or
neocortical standard for death). See generally Defining Death, supra note 26, at 38-39
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personhood hinges on cognitive function,101 and therefore an ab-
sence of "higher brain" function coristitutes an absence of life.
Under this standard, anencephalic infants would be considered
dead despite their brainstem activity.
Doctor Michael Harrison has suggested adoption of a new
"brain-absent" criterion for death that is limited only to
anencephalic infants and has the same medical-legal implications
as whole brain death.1"2 Doctor Harrison argues that the whole
brain definition of death was adopted to protect only comatose pa-
tients who may recover brain functioning. He asserts that this pre-
caution does not apply to anencephalic infants, who can never
have the physical structure necessary for higher brain activity or
cognitive function. Therefore, creating a special category for
anencephalic infants would be consistent with the policies underly-
ing the general requirement of whole brain death.0 3
Another possible solution would be to modify the UDDA's
definition of death to include anencephaly. California Senator
Milton Marks introduced a bill in February of 1986 that would
amend the UDDA to state that "an individual born with the con-
dition of anencephaly is dead."'0 4 The senator later modified his
bill, however, to propose that a state health advisory board make
recommendations concerning the care of infants with life-threat-
ening conditions, including the "feasibility and necessity" of in-
fant organ transplants, the donation of organs from anencephalic
infants, and any "necessary changes" in the UDDA or UAGA.'0 5
Finally, a Working Party of the Medical Royal Colleges in
Great Britain redefined the determination of death for
anencephalic infants as cessation of spontaneous respiration (ap-
nea). 16 They found that although brainstem function tests are
(explaining "higher brain" formulations).
101. See, e.g., Green & Wikler, supra note 100, at 127 ("[A] person ceases to exist
with the destruction of whatever processes there are which normally underlie that person's
psychological continuity and connectedness."); Veatch, supra note 100, at 29 (stating that
the essential element of personhood is "capacity for experience and social interaction").
But see infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
102. Harrison, The Anencephalic Newborn as Organ Donor, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., April 1986, at 21, 21.
103. Id. But see Arras & Shinnar, Anencephalic Newborns as Organ Donors: A Cri-
tique, 259 J. A.M.A. 2284, 2285 (1988) (arguing that Harrison reinterpreted the original
intent of the whole brain definition of death).
104. Capron, supra note 34, at 6.
105. Id.
106. Milunsky, Harvesting Organs for Transplantation From Dying Anencephalic
Infants, 82 PEDIATRIcS 274, 275 (1988).
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useful to determine brain death in adults, the tests are "inapplica-
ble when the forebrain itself is missing.' ' 7 They reasoned that if
brain death plus cessation of apnea is recognized as death in
adults, by analogy, "the absence of the forebrain in these infants
plus apnea would similarly be recognized as death."'' 08
2. Amending the UAGA
Another way to enable anencephalic organ donation before
whole brain death would be to modify the UAGA. This approach
would avoid the broader legal implications of redefining death. A
cortical death standard, for example, would encompass all perma-
nently comatose patients, even if they could breathe on their own
for many years. Arthur Caplan has suggested that the UAGA's
definition of donor should include "those who are brain dead or
those suffering from anencephaly."' 09 In addition, New Jersey As-
semblyman Walter Kern, Jr. proposed a bill in October 1986 to
allow parents to donate the organs of anencephalic infants who
did not meet the UAGA requirement that patients must be
"dead" before organs are removed for transplantation." 0
B. The Intervention Approach
The second major approach to anencephalic organ donation
involves developing procedures that preserve the infants' organs
until total brain death occurs, and only then permitting organs to
be retrieved. This intervention approach is often used for adult
donors."' Two methods can be used to preserve the infant's or-
gans until brain death: life-support and cooling.
1. Maintaining Infants on Life Support Systems
An international, interdisciplinary group of experts convened
in London, Ontario in January 1987 to discuss the use of
anencephalic infants as organ donors." 2 The group agreed that
anencephalic organ donation was ethical only upon determination
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Caplan, supra note 23, at 140.
110. Capron, supra note 34, at 60.
111. E.g., Sources, supra note 2, at 156, 158; Waiters & Ashwal, supra note 16, at
23.
112. Annas, supra note 3, at 36.
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of death using established whole brain death criteria. 11 3 Life-sup-
port would be used to preserve the infants' organs until such death
occurred.114
The life-support theory was first implemented in Baby
Gabriel's case at the Children's Hospital in Western Ontario and
at Loma Linda University Medical Center in California."15 The
success of the Baby Gabriel case prompted both institutions to
formally adopt protocols for transplanting the organs of
anencephalics." 6 Loma Linda reconsidered a protocol that was re-
jected in 1986 because there was no assurance that an
anencephalic infant attached to a respirator would die within a
reasonable time." 7 A modified proposal was formulated in De-
cember 1987.11
This protocol permitted parents to decide whether to donate
their infant's organs once anencephaly was diagnosed."19 If par-
ents made a "firm statement" of their desire to donate their in-
fant's organs and signed a consent form, the infant was given
traditional comfort care plus respirator support for a maximum of
seven days after birth. 20 Only those who met established brain
death criteria within seven days were eligible for organ dona-
tion.12' The seven-day limit was chosen because ninety-five per-
cent of anencephalic infants die within seven days. Physicians
were to examine the infant twice a day and perform the "weaning
test"'122 to determine whether brain death had occurred. If brain
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 37.
116. See Annas, supra note 3, at 37 (describing the Children's Hospital's protocol);
Walters & Ashwal, supra note 16, at 22 (describing Loma Linda's protocol). The protocol
of the Children's Hospital required that the parents agree, before birth, that: (1) the infant
will be resuscitated; (2) periodic testing will be done to determine the established definition
of brain death; (3) organ donation will be acceptable once brain death criteria are met; and
(4) after a definite time limit (to be determined by the parents but no more than fourteen
days), the infant will be removed from the ventilator and permitted to die. In addition,
because it is unknown whether anencephalic infants may experience pain, low doses of
morphine are to be administered to prevent any suffering. Annas, supra note 3, at 37.
117. Walters & Ashwal, supra note 16, at 22.




122. Physicians often use a so-called "weaning test" to determine brain death in pa-
tients on ventilators. Ventilation is discontinued, and physicians wait for carbon dioxide to
accumulate in the blood until the respiratory center, controlled by the brainstem, would
normally initiate breathing. Brain death is established if the brainstem does not respond
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death was confirmed by two physicians not involved in direct care
of the potential organ recipient, the infant was considered for or-
gan donation. 23 The protocol used for all organ donations was fol-
lowed, including a family consent form. 24 Those infants who did
not die within seven days were removed from ventilation and given
comfort care until death did occur.125
When only one of six infants met the criteria of brain death
within seven days, Loma Linda physicians again changed the pro-
tocol.' 26 They explained that "[u]pon evaluation of experience
with the original protocol, it is obvious that provision of full inten-
sive care from birth alters the natural course of dying, resulting in
prolongation of the dying process."'2 7 Under the modified proto-
col, six infants were given only warmth,' nutrition and hydration at
birth. The infants were not placed on life-support at birth, but
only after cardiac-respiratory failure suggested imminent death.'28
The infants were then placed on a ventilator which would preserve
their organs for transplantation for only twenty-four hours. If
brain death criteria were met, ventilation continued and confirma-
tion of brain death was made by an outside neurologist referee. If
brain death criteria were not met, the infants were returned to
basic care where they were withdrawn from mechanical ventila-
tion and allowed to die without further intervention. 29
2. Gradual Cooling of Infants
Doctors Fletcher, Robertson and Harrison suggest an alterna-
tive method of preserving the infants' organs until total brain
death. They propose cooling the anencephalic newborn "by sur-
face applications of cooling* media or by cool intravenous solu-
tions."'1 Although this procedure may hasten brain death by con-
tributing to cerebral swelling, its proponents claim that it is
when the carbon-dioxide level in the blood is sufficient to stimulate respiration. Oxygen is
maintained in the blood during this test to preserve viability of organs; ensure that low-
oxygen levels do not create the false impression that the brainstem is dead; or cause the
death of the brainstem. Fost, Organs from Anencephalic Infants: An Idea Whose Time
Has Not Yet Come, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov. 1988, at 5, 6-7.
123. Waters & Ashwal, supra note 16, at 23.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1671.
127. Walters & Ashwal, supra note 16, at 23.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Sources, supra note 2, at 158.
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morally justified because it does not harm the infants because they
are "beyond the point of injury."''1 Doctor Kantrowitz employed
this cooling method when he used an anencephalic infant's heart
for the first human-to-human heart transplant in the United
States." 2
III. THE CASE AGAINST ANENCEPHALIC ORGAN DONATION
Programs and proposals to obtain organs from anencephalic
infants have provoked strong opposition on all fronts: legal, ethi-
cal, medical and political. In response to these forces, all efforts in
the United States to use anencephalic infants as organ donors
have stopped.'3 3 Loma Linda suspended its ventilation program in
August 1988.'3" What follows is an overview of the most common
objections.
A. The Legal Problem: Redefining Death
Proposals to amend the existing death statutes have been ob-
jected to because such changes violate the spirit of the UDDA and
represent a radical change in legal policy that society will not ac-
cept. Doctor Alexander Morgan Capron, an outspoken opponent
of anencephalic organ donation, claims that proponents of these
amendments are confused about existing law because the term
"brain dead" implies that there are two kinds of death: brain
death, and real or cardiopulmonary death.135 Since the proponents
already recognize a break with the traditional "definition" of
death, he argues, they can justify these amendments as simply an-
other acceptable "definition" of death rather than a radical
change.'16 Doctor Capron and others contend that death is a sin-
gle concept. Although death now can be determined by brain or
cardiopulmonary standards, death is more than just what we
choose to call it.13 7 Therefore, there is no justification for these "as
131. Id. at 159.
132. Annas, supra note 3, at 38.
133. E.g., Caplan, supra note 23, at 129 ("[T]he [kidney] transplants stopped when
legal concerns surfaced regarding the eligibility of anencephalic infants for organ
donation.").
134. Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1671.
135. Capron, supra note 34, at 7.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 7-8; Willke & Andrusko, Personhood Redux, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Nov. 1988, at 30, 33. J.C. Willke is president of the National Right to Life Committee;
Dave Andrusko is editor of the National Right to Life News. Although it is important to
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good as dead" definitions.138 Dying anencephalic infants are just
that, dying: they are not dead.
The President's Commission for the study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
(the President's Commission) expressly rejected the "higher
brain" formulations of death as too radical a departure from
traditional standards in a 1981 report on defining death.1 39 The
Commission concluded that finding death when spontaneous
breathing and heartbeat were present would imply that the tradi-
tional cardiopulmonary standard had always been wrong, even
before medical technology rendered it obsolete in some circum-
stances.1 40 The President's Commission described its position on
defining death as "deliberately conservative," recognizing only
new diagnostic measures of death, not a new concept of death.141
Because it did not find a great enough consensus to radically re-
vise the concept of death, "a matter so fundamental to a society's
sense of itself - touching deeply held personal and religious be-
liefs - and so final for the individuals involved, 42 the Commis-
sion favored the objective whole brain death criteria. 43
B. The Ethical Problem: Respect for Human Life
Many ethicists and physicians strongly object to what they
perceive as the utilitarian underpinnings of all approaches to
anencephalic organ donation: namely, that it is morally justified
note the Right to Life movement's prominent role in opposing anencephalic organ donation,
its position will not be treated separately here. For a discussion of the specific right-to-life
position on this issue, see generally Note, Organ Donors, supra note 17, at 1555-58 (outlin-
ing the position of the right-to-life movement).
138. Capron, supra note 34, at 6-8; see also Arras & Shinnar, supra note 104, at
2285 (The President's Commission believed that "anything short of whole-brain death was
not equivalent to the death of the human being." It insists that "organ donors be dead, not
just irrevocably brain damaged or imminently dying."); Willke & Andrusko, supra note
137, at 33:
"It's taken decades to publicly adopt the new definition of death to include brain
death. We are still trying to educate family members to donate organs of those
who have literally died. Are we now going to ask society to approve the scything
of organs from those who are soon-to-be-dead, virtually dead, as good as dead?"
(quoting Goodman, Giving Birth to an Organ Donor, Star/Tribune, Dec. 12, 1987, at A17,
col. 3).
139. Defining Death, supra note 26, at 39-41.





ANENCEPHALIC INFANTS AS ORGAN DONORS
because it produces the greatest good for the greatest number of
people.
1. Personhood
Many commentators specifically oppose the claim that ob-
taining organs from anencephalic infants is justified because these
infants are not persons. The infants are said to lack personhood
because unlike other permanently unconscious patients, they have
no past cognitive function and lack the physical capacity ever to
have any.""'
The President's Commission rejected this argument because
there is no agreement among philosophers, physicians or the pub-
lic about what constitutes personhood.145 Other commentators ar-
gue that society must maintain a clear definition of legal per-
sonhood that avoids the ambigiities of cognition if society is to
preserve its symbolic commitment to human life. 4 These com-
mentators argue that we must not allow "the possibility that un-
wanted persons can be defined out of existence if it serves the
greater good." 47 Harrison, who proposed creating a special brain
absent category of death, also rejects the personhood argument.
He claims, for example, that this argument belittles the pregnancy
and may adversely affect how the family and infant are treated. 4 '
2. The Slippery Slope
Many critics argue that the immediate procurement ap-
proach, including its personhood rationale, will set a dangerous
precedent. They fear that redefining death or changing the re-
quirements for organ donation will result in the "gradual exploita-
tion of the vulnerable and progressive brutalization of medicine
and society."'1 49
144. For example, Loma Linda physician Dr. Leonard Bailey called an anencephalic
infant "a nonperson human derivative, a resource we should be able to capitalize on."
Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1671; see Martin, Gonzalez, West, Shwartz & Sutorius, Ho-
motransplantation of Both Kidneys From an Anencephalic Monster to a 17 Pound Boy
with Eagle Barrett Syndrome, 66 SURGERY 603 (1969). See generally Sources, supra note
2, at 157 (outlining the personhood argument); supra text accompanying notes 101-102
(Some philosophers use the personhood argument to support a cortical definition of death.),
145. Defining Death, supra note 26, at 39-40.
146. E.g., Sources, supra note 2, at 157-58.
147. Fost, supra note 122, at 7.
148. Harrison, supra note 103, at 22.
149. Botkin, supra note 29, at 254; see also Capron, supra note 34, at 8 ("[I]f soci-
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The most obvious group to be swept in under such legislation
is infants with other neural tube anomalies that are equally fatal
but may allow longer survival, such as hydrencephaly (a condition
in which an infant has normal brain development early in gesta-
tion until an event such as infection destroys the cerebral hemi-
spheres and replaces them with fluid) and microcephaly (a condi-
tion in which the infant has a very small head). 150 The other
group in danger are those persons who, like anencephalic infants,
continue to breathe on their own yet have no "valid" interests in
living due to limited cognitive functioning, such as people who are
in a persistent vegetative state, have Alzheimer's disease or are
severely retarded.15
This concern affects those who practice the intervention ap-
proach as well. Loma Linda's Chief of Neonatology, Dr. Joyce
Peabody stated, "[T]he slippery slope is real.' 52 She noted that
physicians have contacted Loma Linda suggesting infants with
less severe defects than anencephaly be enrolled in the program.153
3. A Means to an End
Writers also argue that anencephalic organ donation is mor-
ally wrong apart from its consequences. They claim that these in-
fants are being used as receptacles for organs.5 4 One commenta-
tor points out that the premise of western medical ethics is to
preserve life at all costs, a principle rooted in Christian and Judaic
theology that prohibits taking human life even to benefit others.'55
Others appeal to Kant's Categorical Imperative, which calls for
humans to be treated as ends in themselves and never used solely
as a means to an end.'15 This Kantian argument has been aimed
at the intervention approach in particular. Gilbert Meilaender, a
professor of religion at Oberlin College, articulates this fear:
"[T]he anticipated organ donation tempts us to treat
ety wants to adopt a policy of sacrificing living patients for their organs, it seems very
strange - and a very bad precedent - to start with the most vulnerable patients.").
150. Capron, supra note 34, at 7.
151. Fost, supra note 122, at 9.
152. Steinfels, Infant Organ Plan Ends: Brief Lives, Large Questions, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 18, 1988, at E8, col. 1.
153. Id.
154. See Blakeslee, Quandaries of Timing on Infant Organs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23,
1988, at C2, col. 6.
155. Botkin, supra note 29, at 254.
156. E.g., id.; Willke & Andrusko, supra note 137, at 31.
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[anencephalic newborns] in ways we otherwise would not -
which is, I fear, a temptation to use this child simply as a means
to another (admittedly desirable) end. . . . What we accomplish
thereby would be good; what we do would not. 157
C. The Medical Problem: Uncertainties
Fueling these ethical objections are several unresolved medi-
cal questions concerning anencephalic organ donation. Little is
known about anencephaly because of its certain, swift fatality or
the success of ventilation programs such as Loma Linda's.
I. Brain Death
Some critics suggest that anencephalic infants theoretically
should not die while on respirators.1 58 Many commentators doubt
whether brain death can be determined in these infants by pres-
ently accepted criteria.1 59 Some have questioned whether Loma
Linda physicians properly confirmed brain death in the infants in
its program. 60 The Task Force on Brain Death in Children, which
contributed to the establishment of the existing criteria for deter-
mining infant brain death, limited its discussion to infants more
than seven-days old."6' Without proper determination of brain
death, some argue that ventilation programs are a subterfuge, a
way to carry out active killing while avoiding the difficult ethical
and legal implications of that approach.'62
157. Meilaender, Commentary, HASTINGS CENTER REP., April 1986, at 22, 23.
158. Shewmon, supra note 21, at 15; Willke & Andrusko, supra note 137, at 31.
159. E.g., Fost, supra note 122, at 6-7; Willke & Andrusko, supra note 137, at 31.
160. Fost, supra note 122, at 7; Willke & Andrusko, supra note 137, at 31. In addi-
tion, the cooling method may create a reversible brain-death state. All brain-death criteria
require that patients are not hypothermic. Walters & Ashwal, supra note 16, at 20.
161. See Report of Special Task Force: Guidelines for the Determination of Brain
Death in Children, 80 PEDIATRIcS 298 (1987); see also Volpe, Brain Death Determination
in Newborn, 80 PEDIATRIcS 293, 296 (1987) ("The two essential requirements for the diag-
nosis of brain death, ie [sic], the establishment of cessation of cerebral and brainstem func-
tions and the demonstration of irreversibility, are extraordinarily difficult to fulfill in the
newborn and young infant . . . Clearly, more information is needed. ). But see
Walters & Ashwal, supra note 16, at 25:
The literature on brain death and research at Loma Linda on determination of
brain death in newborns suggest that the recent Special Task Force guidelines
can be extended to include the preterm and term infant and that the diagnosis of
brain death can usually be determined solely on a clinical basis.
162. See Caplan, supra note 23, at 137.
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2. Misdiagnosis
The possibility of misdiagnosis is often used to support critics'
slippery slope arguments. There is no agreement on specific crite-
ria defining anencephaly.'6 3 In most cases it is obvious, but in
many it is not. 6 Anencephaly lies on a continuum with other
congenital neural defects; while some anencephalic infants have
no cerebral tissue, others have a negligible amount. 6 5 In addition,
the risk of misdiagnosis accompanies any condition, no matter
how obvious.' In fact, there are several reported cases of the
misdiagnosis of anencephaly,167 including one that may have oc-
curred in Loma Linda's anencephalic organ donation program.'68
3. Efficacy
Another problem that some commentators note is that insuffi-
cient evidence exists to show that anencephalic infants will be ef-
fective organ donors. Doctor Alan Shewmon, Assistant Professor
of Pediatrics and Neurology at the University of California at Los
Angeles (UCLA) Medical Center, provides a detailed analysis of
this issue. '16 He "optimistically" estimates that no kidneys, nine
hearts and two livers could be obtained today from anencephalic
infant donors.' In ten years, he projects twenty-five kidneys,
163. Shewmon, supra note 21, at 11-12.
164. Id. at 11.
165. Fost, supra note 122, at 8; see also Shewmon, supra note 21, at 1 l-12 (describ-
ing conditions that are closely related to anencephaly).
166. Fost, supra note 122, at 8.
167. See Baird & Sadovnick, supra note 30, at 270:
While conducting this study, it became obvious that it is important to verify the
diagnosis of anencephaly among those infants reported to survive longer than 7
days. One infant initially coded as anencephaly, who survived over 4 months,
had hydrancephaly rather than anencephaly, and another who lived for 12 days
actually had amniotic band syndrome mimicking anencephaly.
168. See Willke & Andrusko, supra note 137, at 32 ("[O]ne baby entered into
[Loma Linda's] protocol was later referred back to an out-of-state medical center when
[Loma Linda] doctors determined the baby was not a true anencephalic." (citing telephone
interview with Richard Schaefer (Jul. 6, 1988))).
169. See Shewmon, supra note 21, at 15-17; see also Annas, supra note 3, at 38
(questioning the success of infant organ transplants and the viability of anencephalic
newborns as a source of organs in the future); Holzgreve & Belier, supra note 94, at 961
("'[G]radual cooling of the body . . .' does not yield viable organs. ... ); Sources,
supra note 2, at 155-56 ("Whether tissues from anencephalics would always be metaboli-
cally or histologically sound for transplantation remains to be proven, since anencephalics
are known to have hypoplastic cells in tissues.").
170. Shewmon, supra note 21, at 17.
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twelve hearts and seven livers may be obtained.' 7'
First, Professor Shewmon estimates that because
anencephalic infants tend to be born prematurely and have in-
trauterine growth retardation, around sixty percent of the infants
will be "too small to provide useful organs for transplantation."' 7
Second, he assumes that only two-thirds of parents involved will
wish to donate their child's organs.'7M Third, he estimates that up
to fifty percent of the infants have gross associated malformation
of at least one other organ system. Fourth, claiming that the suc-
cess of infant kidney donations has been poor,174 he cites difficul-
ties with the organ referral system: including ensuring blood type
compatibility, geographic proximity, and unmedicated donors.7 5
Fifth, he factors in the paucity of experience with pediatric trans-
plantation.17 And finally, he predicts that prenatal screening will
result in the termination of half of all anencephalic fetuses.177
Loma Linda's experience substantiates some of Professor
Shewmon's concerns. One reason cited for the program's morato-
rium was its lack of success.'78 Only two infants of the twelve
enrolled in its program were determined brain dead within the es-
tablished seven days and thus eligible donors. The two potential
donors were not used, however, because for various reasons recipi-
ents were not available. 79
171. Id.
172. Id. at 15.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 16.
176. Id. at 16-17.
177. Id. at 17. One commentator states that approximately ninety-five percent of
parents whose fetuses are diagnosed as anencephalic elect to abort the fetuses. Shewmon,
supra note 21, at 12. The significant role of abortion in limiting, the availability of
anencephalic infants as organ sources may diminish, however, if the trend toward permit-
ting states to restrict abortion continues. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109
S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (narrowing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which held that the
constitutional right to privacy protects and includes the right of women to choose whether
or not to bear a child).
178. See Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1671. Dr. Joyce Peabody, Chief of Ne-
ontology at Loma Linda, told the Los Angeles Times that: "Certainly, if the only outcome
you are looking at is the number of solid organs transplanted, our program has failed, and
failed dismally." Id.
179. Id. One infant's heart was not used because a recipient could not be found. In
the other case, a heart recipient was found but the blood types were not compatible. Recip-
ients were found waiting for the infants' livers. But when a liver became available one
potential recipient was suffering from an infection, another was in a hospital that was per-
forming another transplant that day and could not do a second, and a third was in a hospi-
tal that wanted to avoid the news media. Id.
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4. Prolonged Survival
Another concern of critics is that respiratory support may
prolong the infants' survival. One pediatric intensive care special-
ist called the ventilation programs "futile and inhumane." '18 The
concern over the use of mechanical ventilators appears two-fold.
Some are worried that respirator support will promote the infants'
long-term survival."8' One of Loma Linda's infants lived for two
months after the respirator was removed, another factor behind
the program's suspension. 2 Others believe the programs will pro-
long the infants' dying process' 83 and possibly expose them to
pain. 84 Loma Linda adjusted its protocol in 1988,1 and sus-
pended its program in part because it wanted to avoid accusations
of "organ farming."'8 6
D. Policy Questions: Weighing the Costs
1. Resource Allocation
The cost of anencephalic organ donation must be considered
in light of the competing demands for other types of health care
and research for children. Doctor Capron claims that amending
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act to allow for organ removal from
180. Annas, supra note 3, at 37.
181. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 3, at 36.
182. See Blakeslee, Infant Transplant Program is Halted to Reassess Issues, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 20, 1988, at 7, col. 1. Doctors Willke and Andrusko claim, without support,
that parents are withdrawing their consent from ventilation programs when their
anencephalic infants do not become brain dead within several days. Willke & Andrusko,
supra note 137, at 31.
183. E.g., Meilaender, supra note 157, at 23. Former U.S. Surgeon General Doctor
C. Everett Koop, stated at the 1982 Hearing on Handicapped Newborns, before the Sub-
committee on Select Education of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor: "Some of nature's errors are extraordinary and frightening. . . but nature
also has the kindness to take them away. For [anencephalic] infants, neither medicine nor
law can be of any help. And neither medicine nor law should prolong these infants' process
of dying." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT 220 n.18 (1983) [hereinafter DECIDING TO FOREGO TREATMENT].
184. See Shewmon, supra note 21, at 15 (There is no "logical or physiological basis
for the claim of some that an anencephalic infant can neither feel nor experience pain 'by
definition.' "); see also Annas, supra note 3, at 38 ("If . . . medical maintenance causes
prolonged . . . suffering in anencephalic infants, their use as organ donors would be unac-
ceptable."). Most commentators, however, believe that anencephalic infants are incapable
of experiencing pain. See, e.g., Fost, supra note 122, at 5; Sources, supra note 2, at 159.
185. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
186. Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1671.
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anencephalics would lead to adoption of several protective mea-
sures that would "unnecessarily encumber the process of organ re-
trieval, increasing its costs and reducing its yield.' 1 87 Loma Linda
President Doctor David B. Hinshaw estimated the total cost of its
program at about $250,000.188 This figure includes the cost of the
commercial air ambulance used to transport potential donor in-
fants, the transport team, care during the infants' lives, and asso-
ciated costs.' 89
2. The Organ Donor System
There is a fear that using anencephalic infants as organ do-
nors would undermine the public's trust in transplantation and the
organ donor system.' ° They are concerned that anencephalic do-
nations may cause the public to suspect that other dying persons
or persons deemed to have no interests in living may be used as
nonvoluntary donors.' 9 ' Professor Capron claims that treating
anencephalic infants as suitable organ donors would confuse the
definition of "death" and cause relatives and health care personnel
to become uncertain of all organ donations. 19 2 Doctors Willke and
Andrusko write, "How ironic it would be if in tampering with the
definition of death to allow removal of organs from anencephalic
infants, ethicists and transplant surgeons kill the goose that trans-
plants the golden egg."' 93
There also are fears that anencephalic organ donation will
prompt abuses in the system, further undermining the public's
trust. For example, physicians may pressure parents into carrying
their child to term or manipulate the time and manner of the
birth.'9 Also, parents may sell the organs of their anencephalic
infants.195
3. Protecting Parents and Health Care Personnel
Some argue that the psychological cost to parents and health
187. Capron, supra note 34, at 9.
188. Id.
189. Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1671.
190. Capron, supra note 34, at 9.
191. See id. at 8.
192. See id. at 7.
193. Willke & Andrusko, supra note 137, at 33.
194. Botkin, supra note 29, at 254; Capron, supra note 34, at 8.
195. Comment, supra note 84, at 454. One commentator notes that making such
practices illegal would be an effective deterrent to such sales. Id.
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care personnel may be too great. Parents may suffer through not
only the tragedy of their infant's condition, but also the disap-
pointment of a failed transplant or lack of recipient.196 Some com-
mentators also consider the harmful effect upon health care per-
sonnel in this situation.197 Publicity and political pressure created
tension among Loma Linda's staff and undermined morale - an-
other reason cited by Loma Linda officials for its program's
suspension. 118
IV. THE COMPETING INTERESTS: BALANCING BENEFICENCE
AND RESPECT FOR LIFE
Three parties are involved in this debate: the infants, the par-
ents and society as a whole. Only when these parties' interests are
considered separately can the objections to obtaining organs from
anencephalic infants properly be evaluated.
A. The Infants' Interests
Theoretically, infants possess the same constitutional rights
as adults, including the right of privacy and self-determination. 9
However, because infants cannot express their interests, adults
must decide their fates. In cases presenting medical-treatment is-
sues, courts have used the "best interests" standard to protect in-
fants.200 Under this standard, the President's Commission recom-
mended 201 that decision-makers must determine an infant's best
interests by assuming the infant would want what a reasonable
person in similar circumstances would want.20 2 The President's
Commission cautioned decision-makers to evaluate the benefits
and burdens from the infant's perspective and not impose their
own values on the infant.20 3
196. Annas, supra note 3, at 38; Willke & Andrusko, supra note 137, at 33.
197. See Capron, supra note 34, at 7. See generally Youngner, Allen, Bartlett, Cas-
corbi, Hau, Jackson, Mahowald & Martin, Psychological and Ethical Implications of Or-
gan Retrieval, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 321 (1985) (discussing the "disturbing effects" of
organ retrieval on health care personnel in the intensive care unit and operating room).
198. Note, Organ Donors, supra note 17, at 1550.
199. See generally Note, Life-Prolonging Treatment Decisions for Defective
Newborns: Who Should Make the Choice?, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 675, 680-82 (1984)
[hereinafter Note, Life-Prolonging] (providing an overview of infants' interests in treat-
ment decisions).
200. Id.
201. DECIDING TO FOREGo TREATMENT, supra note 183, at 136.
202. See id. at 134-36
203. Id. at 219.
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Withholding treatment and providing only "comfort care"
has been considered in the best interest of anencephalic infants
since there is no medical solution to their problem.2 04 This prac-
tice complies with the President's Commission's determination
that it may be in an infant's best interest to withhold "clearly
futile therapies" if that infant cannot be treated and will live only
for hours or days, such as anencephalic infants.20 5 The Commis-
sion noted, however, that "Lj]ust as with older patients, even when
cure or saving of life are out of reach, obligations to comfort and
respect a dying person remain. 206 It recommended that these in-
fants be provided relief from suffering, including feeding and med-
ication for pain and sedation if necessary.
20 7
Professor Capron and others argue that as one of society's
"most vulnerable patients, 208 the anencephalic infant's best inter-
est precludes any shortening or prolonging of life. He states: "Un-
consenting, incompetent patients who have never had a chance to
express their views about whether, if near death but not yet dead,
they would want their bodies cut up for purposes of organ dona-
tion, are the least suitable source [for organ donation]. ' '"29
Although the "best interests" standard proves useful in most
cases, s21 notably where infants may find their lives meaningful de-
spite their severe handicaps,21' it is problematic when applied to
anencephalics. Because anencephalic infants lack any capacity or
potential for human life, it is impossible to determine their best
interests with respect to organ donation.212 It would be just as rea-
sonable for these infants to wish to sacrifice themselves for the
good of their parents and the persons whose lives they may save as
it would be for them to reject interventions to enable organ dona-
tion. Any decision about the children's best interests would neces-
sarily be an imposition of the decision-maker's values: The infants,
who lack awareness of both their condition and what life holds for
them, neither have nor will have any "views" of their own. The
anencephalic infant, therefore, has no interests upon which to base
204. Waiters & Ashwal, supra note 16, at 21.
205. See DECIDING TO FOREGo TREATMENT, supra note 183, at 219.
206. Id. at 220.
207. Id.
208. Capron, supra note 34, at 8.
209. Id.
210, Waiters & Ashwal, supra note 16, at 21.
211. See DECIDING/r FOREGo TREATMENT, supra note 183, at 219 n.79.
212. See Caplan, supa note 23, at 131; Walters & Ashwal, supra note 16, at 21.
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a decision about organ donation.213 The decision whether to use
their organs must reflect the interests of others - namely, parents
and society.
B. The Parents' Interests
The law presumes that parents are the most appropriate deci-
sion-makers for their children.2"4 Common law - reflecting the
philosophy of Hobbes, Locke and Mill - considered children
their parents' chattels. Parents controlled, educated and provided
for their children in return for obedience, while children had few
rights, if any.2 15 Today, parents possess the more limited right of
parental autonomy. Developed under constitutional principles of
religious freedom, due process and right of privacy, this right al-
lows parents to decide how their family shall live without exces-
sive interference from the state.21 6
Accordingly, most medical decisions concerning minors rests
with parents.1 7 Children often cannot effectively consent to medi-
cal treatment, and in most cases, parents are present, concerned
and eager to cooperate with physicians.1 8 Courts rarely review
parents' decisions if the following conditions exist: (1) the parents
are choosing from professionally accepted treatments; (2) the
child's disease or condition is not severe or life-threatening; (3) it
is not possible to delay decisions about treatment until the child
reaches maturity; and (4) parents have a reasonable concern that
the risks of treatment outweigh its benefits, even if withholding
that treatment may be life-threatening. 1 9 In addition, parents
generally may decide how to dispose of their child's body,220
whether their child's organs will be donated,221 and whether their
213. See Walters & Ashwal, supra note 16, at 21. Several commentators believe
anencephalic infants have no interests at all. See Caplan, supra note 23, at 138 ("[T]here
is no meaningful sense in which anencephalic infants can be said to have any of the proper-
ties associated with interests ...."); Transplant Policy Center, supra note 36, at 29
("[T]here are no intrinsic interests of anencephalics to be defended.").
214. See Deciding to Forego Treatment, supra note 176, at 212.
215. See NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BI-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH IN-
VOLVING CHILDREN 73 (1977) [hereinafter Research Report].
216. DECIDING TO FOREGO TREATMENT, supra note 183, at 212 n.62.
217. See id. at 213.
218. Id. at 214-15.
219. Id. at 213.
220. Caplan, supra note 23, at 131.
221. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 3(a)(3), 8a U.L.A. 13 (Supp. 1990).
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child can participate in research. 22
However, infants also are under the parens patriae power of
the state. The parens patriae doctrine, "literally 'parent of the
country' ",223 gives the state standing to protect the health, com-
fort and welfare of its citizens.224 It originates from the English
common law, where the King was "guardian to persons with legal
disabilities such as infants, idiots and lunatics. '' 225 The state may
punish parents or others who abuse or neglect children.226 Courts
also will appoint guardians when they find that the parents are
incapable of making decisions concerning their children, or if the
parents' choice conveys a disregard for their child's welfare.227
This occurs most often when parents choose unconventional medi-
cal care for their children or refuse to consent to ordinary medical
care that will save their child's life.228
As discussed above, it is clear that parents may authorize the
nontreatment of anencephalic newborns. The President's Commis-
sion recommended that parents of anencephalic infants be author-
ized to reject "clearly futile therapies" for their newborns.229 In
addition, the 1984 amendments to the federal Child Abuse Pre-
vention and Treatment Act 230 provide three exceptions to the
Act's prohibition against withholding medically indicated treat-
ment from handicapped infants, all of which apply to
anencephalic infants. The Act sanctions nontreatment of handi-
capped infants if:
(A) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose;
(B) the provision of such treatment would
(i) merely prolong dying,
(ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of
the infant's life-threatening conditions, or
(iii) otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of the
222. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.408 (1989).
223. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
224. See generally Note, Life-Prolonging, supra note 190, at 686-90 (providing an
overview of the parens patriae doctrine).
225. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 223, at 1003.
226. DECIDING TO FOREGO TREATMENT, supra note 183, at 212; see Note, Life-
Prolonging, supra note 199, at 683.
227. DECIDING TO FOREGO TREATMENT, supra note 183, at 213; Note, Lfe-Prolong-
ing, supra note 199, at 689.
228. DECIDING TO FOREGO TREATMENT, supra note 183, at 213-14 n.67.
229. See id. at 219.
230. Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5101-5106h (Supp. III 1985)).
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infant; or
(C) the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile
in terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself
under such circumstances would be inhumane."'
The relevant interest of parents here, however, is to shorten
or prolong their infants' lives in order to obtain the infants' organs
for transplantation. 2  There is no legal authority that supports
the parents' autonomy in this situation.233 But there are several
ways that the state could intervene if parents attempted to author-
ize organ procurement from their infants: including through the
criminal law system, the federal regulations governing research in-
volving children, and common law standards for organ donations
by minors.
1. The Criminal Law System
Parents and surgeons could be prosecuted for criminal homi-
cide and assault for obtaining organs from anencephalic infants.
First, surgeons who hasten an anencephalic's death or remove an
anencephalic's organs before the infant is legally dead, could be
prosecuted for murder under the Model Penal Code (MPC) stan-
dard. 4 Second, a surgeon who removes organs from an infant
after he or she has been artificially maintained and declared brain
dead may be prosecuted for murder or manslaughter 23 5 if the in-
fant did not meet brain death criteria.3 It is homicide to kill a
231. 42 U.S.C. § 5102(3) (Supp. III 1985) (recodified at U.S.C.A. § 5106g (10)
(Supp. V 1987).
232. The President's Commission did recommend that physicians respect parents' re-
quest for futile treatments if they do not cause suffering. But generally, the parents' inten-
tions are to prolong their infants' lives and provide "hope against hope," not to preserve the
infants' organs for donation. See DECIDING TO FOREGO TREATMENT, supra note 183, at
219-20.
233. Parents who do not consent to any methods that would enable organ donation
obviously have different interests, but they are not part of this controversy since their
wishes are always respected.
234. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1) (1985). Under the MPC, murder is a killing
committed "purposely or knowingly" or "recklessly under circumstances manifesting ex-
treme indifference to the value of human life." Id. State statutes may vary from the MPC
standard.
235. The Model Penal Code defines manslaughter as criminal homicide "committed
recklessly." Id. at § 210.3. Again, state statutes may vary.
236. A physician is being criminally investigated in Britain for allegedly removing
organs from an anencephalic before the infant was legally dead. Comment, supra note 84,
at 452 n.24 (citing Vines, Row Over Anencephalic Babies Reaches Britain, 115 New Sci-
entist 17 (1987)).
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person who is already dying, to hasten death, or to kill a "worth-
less" victim." 7 However, evidence showing the defendant believed
his or her conduct was morally justified is among the mitigating
circumstances recognized for homicide in the MPC. 8 Third, it is
possible that surgeons could be prosecuted for simple or aggra-
vated assault under the MPC if they remove an infant's organs,
close the wound, and allow the infant to die naturally. 39
Parents could be prosecuted along with the surgeons. Under
the MPC, they could be prosecuted as accomplices if they pro-
mote or facilitate the surgeon's crime.240 Alternatively, they could
be prosecuted for the lesser crime of solicitation if they com-
manded, encouraged or requested the specific criminal conduct. 41
Parents also could be criminally prosecuted under state child-
abuse laws for authorizing any of the methods that enable organ
procurement from their infants.242
2. Federal Research Regulations
Through federal regulations that govern research, the govern-
ment may override parents' wishes to place their anencephalic in-
fants in ventilation programs such as Loma Linda's. 4" These pro-
grams would probably be considered research because
237. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, JR., supra note 79, at § 7.1(d).
238. The MPC advises courts to consider mitigating circumstances including
whether "the murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant believed to
provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6
(4)(d) (1985).
239. Surgeons could be charged with simple assault under the Model Penal Code for
"attempt[ing] to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury to
another" or "negligently caus[ing] bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon." Id. at §
21 l.l.(l)(a), (b). They also could be charged with aggravated assault for "attempt[ing] to
cause serious bodily injury to another, or caus[ing] such injury purposely, knowingly or
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life," or "attempt[ing] to cause or purposely or knowingly caus[ing] [such injury] with a
deadly weapon." Id. at § 211.1.(2)(a),(b); see Fost, supra note 122, at 8 (noting that "in
such a case, killing would not be the proper term; battery, not homicide, might be the
charge.").
240. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (3)(a) (1985).
241. Id. at § 5.02.
242. See generally U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, State Statutes Re-
lated to Child Abuse and Neglect: 1986 (1987) (a collection of child abuse laws).
243. The immediate procurement approach most likely would not be considered "re-
search" because it has been proven effective. West German surgeons who have employed
the active-killing method call their procedure an "innovative treatment" rather than fetal
research. Kidney Transplantation, supra note 93, at 1069.
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anencephalic infants are rarely placed on life-support systems,244
and critical information is needed on topics such as the effect of
respirator support, the reliability of determining brain death in in-
fants, and the ability of infants to feel pain.245
Research that directly benefits children is generally consid-
ered justifiable.2 46 But troubling questions arise when research will
not help the subject even though the research may advance scien-
tific knowledge or may benefit other children. Children's inability
to consent is the underlying problem.247 The first principle of the
1949 Nuremberg Code implicitly prohibits involving children in
research: "The voluntary consent of the human subject is abso-
lutely essential. This means that the person involved should have
the legal capacity to give consent .... ,248 The Declaration of
Helsinki, published in 1964 by the World Medical Association,249
is more liberal. It provides that "if [the subject] is legally incom-
petent the consent of the legal guardian should be secured" for
nontherapeutic research.2 50 The Declaration was generally ac-
cepted in the United States, resulting in the existing practice of
obtaining third-party permission, or "proxy consent," for research
that does not directly benefit an incompetent subject. 1
Federal regulations were not clear on the issue of consent for
nontherapeutic research, however. 52 But the issue was resolved by
the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical or Behavioral Research (National Commission), es-
tablished in 1974 to "identify the requirements for informed con-
sent to participation in . . . research by children, prisoners, and
244. Annas, supra note 3, at 37.
245. Id.; see also The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guide-
lines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, 2-4, 4 (1978) (discussing the
distinction between practice and research and stating that "the general rule is that if there
is any element of research in an activity, that activity should undergo review for the protec-
tion of human subjects").
246. RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 215, at 91.
247. Id.
248. TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, vol. II, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949,
p.181-82, reprinted in R. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 425
(2d ed. 1986).
249. RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 215, at 93.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See id. at 93-94 (reviewing inadequate Department of Health, Education and
Welfare policy and regulations).
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the institutionalized mentally infirm. 25 3
Based on the National Commission's recommendations, 254 the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) published reg-
ulations in 1983 providing "additional protections for children in-
volved as subjects in research." 55 These regulations formally gov-
ern only federally funded research;2 56 their sanction is the loss of
federal funds to the research institution.25 7 But they serve as a
national standard that many institutions apply to all research.2 58
The regulations divide research into four classes, depending on the
risks and benefits involved; Three classes could apply here.
Though informed parental consent is required for each of these
259provisions, consent alone is never sufficient to authorize re-
search. At the very least, institutional review boards (IRBs) 260
must first determine which classification covers the research
before the parents' consent is operative.
Section 46.404 allows research that the IRB finds does not
involve "greater than minimal risk. '261 Minimal risks are defined
as "risks of harm anticipated in the proposed research ...not
greater. . . than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or dur-
ing the performance of routine physical or psychological examina-
tions or tests. 26 2 The risk posed by organ procurement from
anencephalic infants could be determined minimal because the in-
fants have no interests.
Under some circumstances, Section 46.406 approves research
in which the IRB determines there is no direct benefit to the sub-
ject and a "minor increase over minimal risk, ' 263 but which
promises "generalizable knowledge" about the subjects' condition
that is of "vital importance for the understanding or amelioration
of the subjects' disorder or condition. 26 4 This section also requires
253. R. LEVINE, supra note 248, at 235.
254. Id. at 235-36.
255. Additional Protections for Children Involved as Subjects in Research, 45
C.F.R. §§ 46.401-46.409 (1988).
256. Id. at § 46.101.
257. Id. at § 46.123.
258. Walters & Ashwal, supra note 16, at 26.
259. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116, 46.408(b) (1988).
260. Institutional review boards are established at each individual institution where
research is being conducted to review and approve of the research and enforce the criteria
of the federal regulations. See 45 C.F.R. §9 46.103-46.115 (1988).
261. Id. at § 46.404.
262. Id. at § 46.102(g).
263. Id. at § 46.406(a).
264. Id. at § 46.406(c).
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that the project present experiences "reasonably commensurate"
with the subject's actual or expected situation.2 65 "Minor increase
over minimal risk" is not defined. 2 6 This provision also could be
applied, since the risk could be viewed as a minor increase over
minimal risk and the research would provide knowledge about
anencephaly that is important for understanding (if not ameliora-
tion) of the condition.
When certain conditions are met, section 46.407 allows re-
search that the IRB will not approve under the previous sec-
tions.267 First, the IRB must determine that "the research presents
a reasonable opportunity to further the understanding, prevention,
or alleviation of a serious problem affecting the health or welfare
of children. 268 In addition, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, after consulting an expert panel and opening the propo-
sal to public review and comment, must agree with the IRB's con-
clusion and make other findings, including that "[t]he research
will be conducted in accordance with sound ethical principles. 2 69
For example, the National Commission permits research to de-
velop a safe and effective vaccine which is justified by the threat
of an epidemic.2 70 This provision could allow approval of the re-
search even if the risk of prolonged survival or suffering was great,
because the research is sure to alleviate many serious health
problems of children as long as it is conducted ethically.
Thus, if the IRB determines that ventilation programs fall
into one of these three categories, it may allow the research upon
parental consent. If it determines that none apply, the regulations
may prevent the IRB from allowing anencephalic infant participa-
tion - even if the parents consent.
3. Common Law Standards For Organ Donations By Minors
Courts have not considered whether parents may authorize
265. Id. at § 46.406(b). This situation includes the subject's "medical, dental, psy-
chological, social or educational" status. Id. at § 46.406 (b).
266. The National Commission provided some guidance, however. It recommended
that IRBs estimate risk from at least four perspectives: a common-sense estimation of the
risk or estimates of risk based on the results of similar procedures; any statistical informa-
tion available; and the proposed subject's situation. RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 215, at
8-9.
267. 45 C.F.R. § 46.407 (1988).
268. Id. at § 46.407(a).
269. Id. at § 46.407(b).
270. RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 215, at 127.
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the shortening or prolonging of their child's life for the sake of
another. However, an analogous situation is presented in cases
where parents wish to donate the organs of one of their living chil-
dren for the benefit of another, often a brother or sister.
In the leading case in the area, Bonner v. Moran,271 while the
court did not discern when parental consent is sufficient to author-
ize such procedures, the court did hold that parental consent is
necessary when a minor receives no direct benefit from medical
procedures 2 A fifteen-year-old boy had agreed to undergo sev-
eral skin-grafting operations at his aunt's request to provide trans-
plants for his severely burned cousin.2 7 3 The boy missed two
months of school, suffered substantial pain, was subjected to the
risks of anesthesia, and suffered permanent disfigurement. 274 His
mother did not know of the first operation.Y
A Connecticut court did speak to the sufficiency issue how-
ever. It held that under its equitable powers, it could permit par-
ents to authorize donations by one child for another, but if the
circumstances reflected some benefit to the donor and donee, mini-
mal risk to the donor, the donor's consent, or harm to the donor if
the recipient dies.276 The court held that parents of twins could
consent to the donation of one twin's kidney to the other, but only
"after a close, independent and objective investigation of their mo-
tivation and reasoning. '277 The court found that a kidney trans-
plant was necessary for the twin's survival, the prognosis was ex-
cellent, the risks were negligible for both twins, and the donor
twin would benefit from saving her sister's life. 78
In contrast, a Louisiana court held that neither parents nor
the courts could authorize surgery to enable a mentally retarded-
teenage boy to donate a kidney to his adult sister.279 Though the
court found "no doubt that .. .a kidney transplant would be
more beneficial to [his sister] than any other known remedy," it
was not an "absolute immediate necessity" because dialysis could
271. 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
272. Id. at 123.
273. Id. at 121.
274. Id. at 123.
275. Id. at 121.
276. Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. Ct. 368, 375, 289 A.2d 386, 391 (1972).
277. Id. at 375, 289 A.2d at 390.
278. Id. at 377-78, 289 A.2d at 390-91.
279. In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 187 (La. App. 1973).
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preserve her life.280 The court rejected the argument that the
transplant was in the boy's best interest because his sister would
be able to take care of the disabled boy when his parents died.281
The court concluded that the surgery and loss of a kidney
"clearly" would be against the boy's best interest.282
Obviously, the anencephalic infant donor is easily distin-
guished from these donors: the infants lack any interests and are
certain to die regardless of the donation. Courts may sympathize
with the parents' wishes and permit them to authorize donation -
notwithstanding possible violations of criminal laws and federal
research regulations. The benefit to the donee is clear, and the
court may find the benefit to the donor irrelevant and the risk
minimal because of the infant's lack of awareness and certain
death. Nevertheless, this line of authority shows that although pa-
rental consent is essential for nontherapeutic interventions, it is
not necessarily sufficient. Courts will assert their power to review
these parental decisions.
Thus, it is clear that parents could refuse to allow donation of
their anencephalic infants' organs and authorize nontreatment as
part of their parental rights. But their consent does not provide a
sufficient basis for allowing donation. The state could intervene
through its laws, regulations or courts. Because the usual stan-
dards have not been applied to this situation, state intervention
will depend on societal interests.
C. Society's Interests
1. Immediate Procurement Approach
Proponents of the immediate procurement approach believe
that the societal interest in the benefits of anencephalic organ do-
nation outweigh all other interests. Removing the infants' organs
immediately, they argue, will save countless lives and respect the
wishes of the infants' parents without harming the infants, who
280. Id. at 187.
281. Id.
282. Id. The court analogized the situation to donation of a minor's property. It
found:
Since our law affords this unqualified protection against intrusion into a compar-
atively mere property right, it is inconceivable to us that it affords less protection
to a minor's right to be free in his person from bodily intrusion to the extent of
loss of an organ unless such loss be in the best interest of the minor.
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have no potential for awareness in their short lives. Some propo-
nents believe that the infants are not persons." 3 The Michigan
Transplant Policy Center articulates the utilitarian rationale be-
hind this approach: "[O]ne would need to be intoxicated by ab-
stract principle to refuse to seek to do the good that can be
done." '84 Fletcher, Harrison and Robertson observe: "It may be
that a majority of the community would give a higher priority to
the life of persons needing transplants than to symbolic commit-
ments that do not directly protect other persons. ' '28 And Caplan
calls it "hollow sentimentality to prohibit such gifts on the
grounds that it is repugnant to certain sensibilities to do So. '1286
Critics of the immediate procurement approach argue that
whatever constitutes personhood, anencephalic infants are living
human beings; they may be dying, but they are not dead. The
interest of society in respect for human life is stronger than its
interest in the unknown benefits of anencephalic organ dona-
tion. 7 First, they argue, the law should preserve its commitment
to human life by maintaining a clear and consensual definition of
death and a firm standard against killing.288 Brain death is pres-
ently considered a valid standard for determining death.28 Rede-
fining death would create confusion and call into question the va-
lidity of brain death criteria: Is society manipulating this most
fundamental concept to serve its immediate social needs? Is brain
death a new definition of death or simply another criteria for de-
termining death? Is there a true definition of death at all, or is
death merely a social construct? Regardless of the answers to
these questions, many would not easily label infants who breathe
on their own, yawn and suck, as dead in order to permit removal
of their organs.
A second concern buttressing the respect-for-life interest is
that the immediate procurement approach may lead to the use of
patients with similar disorders or no consciousness as involuntary
donors. 290 This slippery slope argument, however, is not enough to
283. See supra notes 101-02 & 144 and accompanying text.
284. Transplant Policy Center, supra note 36, at 29.
285. Sources, supra note 2, at 158.
286. Caplan, supra note 23, at 138.
287. See supra notes 169-79 and accompanying text.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46.
289. See supra notes 71-87 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
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reject this approach. 91 As one commentator notes, "Everything
leads to something, often something bad."29 2 Legislation could al-
leviate this danger by either explicitly limiting its application to
anencephalic infants 93 or requiring complete cortical death.9 4
But the concern is valid. Such legislation could in fact lead to the
brutalization and desensitization of the medical community and
undermine the public's trust in transplantation and the organ do-
nor system.295 There also is a history of misdiagnosis with
anencephaly. 96 And future developments may complicate the
problem. For example, what if physicians someday can diagnosis
permanent coma with the same certainty as anencephaly? Would
these patients then be subject to forced organ donations?29 7
A final question that tilts the scale in favor of the respect-for-
life interest for critics of the immediate procurement approach is:
Is the need for infant organs great enough to justify such extreme
measures? 298 Opponents of this approach maintain that there is
not enough evidence to show that anencephalic organ donation
will be successful enough to warrant making exceptions to such
fundamental legislation as that concerning death.299
2. The Intervention Approach
Critics of the intervention approach also argue that society's
interest in respect for persons outweighs its interest in the benefits
of obtaining anencephalic organs. Perhaps their strongest argu-
ment is that it is wrong to use the infants as a means to an end.300
Doctors Fletcher, Robertson and Harrison respond that this prohi-
bition fails to apply to the cooling method.30 1 Instead, it is morally
legitimate according to the double effect theory.302 Under this the-
ory, three criteria are weighed to determine if causing an evil ef-
fect to create a good effect is justifiable. First, the actor must not
291. Fost, supra note 122, at 8.
292. Id.
293. See supra notes 109 and accompanying text.
294. Fost, supra note 122, at 8.
295. Id.
296. See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
297. Fost, supra note 122, at 8.
298. See supra notes 169-79 and accompanying text.
299. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 3, at 38.
300. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
301. Sources, supra note 2, at 158.
302. Id. at 159.
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intend to cause the evil effect. 3 Second, the evil must never pre-
cipitate the good effect; both effects must occur at the same
time.304 Third, a sufficiently grave reason for the evil effect must
exist.305 According to this theory, physicians who use the cooling
method do not intend to cause death but to preserve organs. The
hastening of death is an "acknowledged but unintended effect of a
primary intent to preserve organs."30 Second, the preservation of
organs and hastening of death occur simultaneously; death does
not cause the organs' viability.307 Finally, saving lives is a suffi-
ciently grave reason to obtain the organs in this way.308
Proponents of ventilation programs argue that the interven-
tion approach does not violate Kant's categorical imperative. They
point out that philosophers disagree about what Kant meant by
persons as ends. One philosopher believes that Kant meant posses-
sors of "good will"; 309 another believes he meant rational beings
with autonomous reasoning ability.3 10 Neither of these definitions
would apply to the anencephalic infant. Others argue that regard-
less of how the principle is interpreted, Kant most likely did not
consider non-self-aware humans, such as anencephalic infants, in
his writings.311 Two commentators conclude that the maxim is a
myth, an ideal that supports "our sense of exalted human worth
and individual rights" but has limits.31 2 They caution that becom-
ing "more enamored with symbolic rather than actual personal
life" could lead to "compelling utilitarian claims of a great num-
ber of persons who would be moral victims of a thoroughgoing
Kantian ethic."31
Patients are treated for another's benefit in at least three
analogous situations. 1 4 First, it is standard practice to switch ef-
forts from prolonging life to maintaining viability of organs before







309. See Walters & Ashwal, supra note 16,-at 21.
310. Id. See also Transplant Policy Center, supra note 36, at 29 (Kant was referring
to an "autonomous moral agent, a rational human will" in his categorical imperative).
311. Walters & Ashwal, supra note 16, at 21.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 23.
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cidents are placed on respirators while still alive for the benefit of
their fetuses, and are artificially maintained after brain death un-
til the fetus is viable. Third, dying newborns are often kept alive
until relatives can see them. 15
V. A MIDDLE GROUND
At this time, the threat that the immediate procurement ap-
proach poses to the societal interest in respect for human life out-
weighs the uncertain benefits of obtaining these infants' organs.
Amending legislation that defines a social concept as fundamental
as death would be dangerous and premature for it may sweep in
other patients with similar disorders, and lead to desensitization of
the medical community.
The societal interest in the enormous potential of the ventila-
tion programs far outweighs the abstract, Kantian respect-for-life
concerns used to oppose them. In the context of research, the Na-
tional Commission wrote that a "child involved in research may
be used as a means, but not merely as a means; for no investigator
is free to use a child in any way he wishes." 1' It found the impor-
tant question was whether the treatment itself, or how the chil-
dren are used, is immoral.317
Some critics of the ventilation programs claim the interven-
tion is futile and inhumane. Their most concrete objection is that
the programs prolong the infants' dying process or long-term sur-
vival and possibly expose them to pain or premature organ pro-
curement. However, futile treatment is not necessarily inhumane.
Physicians may establish that interventions do not expose the in-
fants to pain or undignified handling, promote long-term survival,
or allow premature organ procurement. If so, there would be great
dignity in saving lives and respecting the urgent wishes of parents.
If society is to realize the benefits of its progress, research
and innovation are vital. Doctor Joyce Peabody, Loma Linda's
Chief of Neonatology, quoted Kierkegaard in this regard: "Life
can only be understood backwards, but it must be lived for-
wards." 8' However, rather than physicians and institutions going
forward with these programs on their own, bodies that represent
societal interests - such as Congress, the courts, or the DHHS
315. Id.
316. RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 215, at 99.
317. Id.
318. Brief Lives, Large Questions, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1988, at E8, col. 1.
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- must forge a consensus. This note proposes that ventilator pro-
grams such as Loma Linda's should be conducted to enable
anencephalic organ donation. However, the programs should in-
clude the following safeguards to ensure that the programs are
conducted according to sound ethical principles:
1. Research. Research is vital to a better understanding of
the benefits and risks involved in anencephalic organ donation.
More information is needed on such topics as the nature and
cause of anencephaly; the long-term effect of respirator support on
anencephalic infants; the reliability of determining brain death in
the infants; the ability of anencephalic infants to feel pain; the
accuracy of diagnosis with anencephaly; and the efficacy of ob-
taining organs from anencephalic babies, depending on the availa-
bility of recipients, the quality of organs obtained, the advance-
ment of pediatric transplantation, and the effect of such programs
on health care personnel.
2. Brain Death Determination. Valid criteria for determining
brain death in these infants must be established and rigorously
followed.
3. Time Limits on Respirators. Limits must be placed on the
time infants are attached to respirators to ensure the ventilation
does not overly prolong the infants' dying process or promote their
long-term survival.
4. Parental Consent. Informed consent must be carefully ob-
tained and fully documented. Safeguards must be established to
prevent any manipulation of the parents' plans.
5. Treatment of Infants. Steps must be taken to ensure that
the infants do not experience any pain and are always treated with
dignity.
6. Cost. The cost of the programs must be considered in light
of the competing demands for other types of health care and re-
search for children.
If these programs prove medically unsuccessful, the immedi-
ate procurement approach should be reexamined in light of the
data collected from the research. At that time, it may be possible
to determine, for example, if there is evidence to support the effi-
cacy of anencephalic organ donation; if the "donation" could be
carried out in an ethically sound manner; and if the law and soci-
ety were willing to be vigilant against the expansion of involuntary
donation into other groups of patients.
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CONCLUSION
The controversy waged over anencephalic organ donation will
not easily be resolved; persuasive arguments abound but medical
knowledge and legal precedent remain scant. Nevertheless, a con-
sensus must be reached. Ultimately, this consensus will reflect
how society balances its interests in the potential benefit of
anencephalic organ donation against respect for human life. This
Note proposes that these interests can best be balanced through
the use of ventilation programs - a middle ground that fosters
both hope and life.
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